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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Bates argued, among other things, that the district 
court erred when it denied her motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. This 
brief is necessary to address several of the State's arguments, including but not limited 
to, its argument that Ms. Bates did not file a motion for substitute counsel and that she 
has no right to counsel in regard to her post-judgment motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea. Ms. Bates argues that she clearly requested the appointment of substitute 
counsel when she wrote in her motion to withdraw her guilty plea "Motion of new 
counsel." Ms. Bates also argues that Idaho case law establishes a statutory right to 
counsel which is co-extensive with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during post-
judgment proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Bates' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bates' motion for the appointment of 
new counsel to represent her in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea?1 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, 
with thirty years fixed, upon Ms. Bates following her plea of guilty to second 
degree murder? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' Rule 35 
motion requesting leniency? 
1 Ms. Bates will only address Issue I in this Reply Brief. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion For The Appointment Of 
New Counsel To Represent Her In Regard To Her Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
The State opens its Reply Brief by arguing that Ms. Bates did not request 
substitute counsel in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, and, based on 
that premise, it argues that Ms. Bates failed to meet the fundamental error standard 
espoused by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.4-8.) The State's argument is not supported by the record, as it 
completely disregards the language employed by Ms. Bates in her motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea. In the affidavit Ms. Bates filed in support of her motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea, she wrote the following: 
I was persistently forced in to signing I was tricked by only reading 
last page last signing after just haven read a continue 2 second x second 
day of meeting, for a more time to come up with money for trial 
Not properly investigated knowledge with held knowledge of others 
confession and explanasion the cover up 
Motion of new counsel 
(Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) (07/08/13 
Augmentation), p.1 (bold emphasis added).) Contrary to the State's assertion, 
Ms. Bates was clearly requesting "new counsel" in regard to her motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea. While the State makes a blanket statement that Ms. Bates never requested 
substitute counsel, it fails to provide an alternative meaning for the phrase "Motion of 
new counsel." The State's attempt to argue that Ms. Bates did not request substitute 
counsel constitutes a blatant disregard for the record. As such, the Perry fundamental 
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error standard is not relevant to this issue, as Ms. Bates' request for the appointment of 
substitute counsel was clearly preserved for appellate review. 
The State next argues, in passing, that the request for the appointment of 
substitute counsel was not preserved for appeal because district court did not enter an 
adverse ruling on that request. (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) Contrary to the State's 
assertion, the request for the appointment of substitute counsel was a subcomponent of 
Ms. Bates' motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which was denied in the district court's 
May 29, 2013, order. (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty 
(07/08/13 Augmentation), pp.1-2.) 
The State then argues that Ms. Bates has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and, therefore, the district court had 
no duty to inquire into her request for the appointment of substitute counsel. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.5.) In support of this position, the State relies on State v. 
Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454 (Ct. App. 2010), where the Court of Appeals held that a post-
judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a "critical stage" for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment and, as such, a defendant has no constitutional right to an attorney to 
pursue such a motion. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) The State's reliance on Hartshorn is 
misplaced because it ignores a critical distinction highlighted in that Opinion. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that Hartshorn only raised a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel claim and did not raise a statutory right to counsel claim pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-852(b). Hartshorn, 149 Idaho at 457-458 n.2. As such, that Opinion did not 
address Hartshorn's statutory right to counsel under I.C. § 19-852. Since Ms. Bates has 
raised her right to counsel under both the Sixth Amendment and under I.C. § 19-852(b) 
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(Appellant's Brief, p.4 ), the Hartshorn Opinion is not controlling. Moreover, Hartshorn 
provides very little guidance, if any, in this matter because of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
insistence that I.C. § 19-852's "statutory right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did 
not guarantee the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel." Hernandez v. 
State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995). The Hernandez Court went on to hold that, "We can 
see no legitimate basis for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining 
whether there has been a violation of a similar constitutional right." Id. 
The State then argues that the appointment of substitute counsel is discretionary 
and, as such, the district court had no "statutory duty of inquiry." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.5 n.1.) The State cites to Murphy v. State, 2014 Opinion No.24 (Feb. 25, 2014) (not 
yet final), for the proposition that when the district court has the discretion to appoint 
counsel there is no constitutionally protected right to counsel after a discretionary 
appointment has been made. (Respondent's Brief, p.5 n.1.) The State's reliance on 
Murphy is misplaced because that case dealt with post-conviction proceedings under 
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCA), I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., 
and this case deals with a post-judgment motion in the direct criminal proceedings. This 
distinction is important because a post-conviction action pursuant to the UPCA is 
deemed a civil action which is a true collateral attack on the defendant's conviction. For 
example, in Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551 (1987), where the Finley court held: 
Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is 
discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, 
and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. It is a collateral attack that 
normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through 
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direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this 
avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by 
the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer 
as well. 
Id. at 556-557 (internal citations omitted). Thus, in Finley, the Court was not 
considering an application of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel or a co-extensive 
statutory right to counsel; rather, it was concerned with the question of whether a post-
conviction petitioner has a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in a collateral attack 
on a conviction. As such, Murphy is inapposite because that Opinion was dealing with 
different proceedings and different rights than those at issue in this matter. 
Additionally, the primary policy rationales behind the holding in Murphy, i.e. 
judicial economy and finality of judgments, are not applicable in the context of 
Ms. Bates' motion to withdraw her guilty plea. In Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court 
overruled Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 ( 1981 ), where it had been held that a UPCA 
petitioner could file a successive petition on the basis that his/her post-conviction 
counsel was ineffective. Murphy, at 5-8. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to 
Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996), for the proposition that the ability 
to file successive post-conviction petitions has allowed post-conviction petitioners to 
make "a sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their ultimate 
penalty with continuous petitions for relief," and, due to this problem, the State "cannot 
guarantee every defendant effective counsel for every claim that may be raised." Id. at 
8. These concerns are not triggered by the post-judgment motion at issue in this case, 
because motions to withdraw guilty pleas cannot be filed ad infinitum. If a defendant 
files a motion to withdraw his/her guilty plea in a direct criminal case, the defendant 
cannot raise the same claim in post-conviction proceedings. Banuelos v. State, 127 
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Idaho 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, a district court loses jurisdiction to entertain 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "once the judgment becomes final, either by 
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. 
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354 (2003). 
Additionally, the State does not address the grave policy implications of 
extending the holding to Murphy to post-judgment motions. The ultimate holding in 
Murphy is that a post-conviction petitioner has no right to effective assistance of counsel 
during post-conviction proceedings. If that holding is extended to post-judgment 
motions, then criminal defendants have no right to either effective assistance of counsel 
or the corollary right to conflict free counsel during post-judgment criminal proceedings. 
Regardless of whether counsel was appointed as a matter of right or in an exercise of 
the district court's discretion, the lay petitioner should be able to rely upon the 
competence of his/her attorney. And when a defendant relies upon that attorney to the 
defendant's own detriment, it is patently unfair to penalize the defendant for counsel's 
errors-regardless of the reason why the attorney was appointed in the first instance. 
Further, as in this case, it is exceptionally unreasonable to hold that Ms. Bates should 
not be able to rely on her counsel because she had the same attorney throughout the 
entirety of the criminal proceedings. Ms. Bates cannot fathom why she should stop 
trusting her attorney after the judgment of conviction has been entered. This 
undermines the credibility of the Idaho State Bar and the legal profession as a whole. It 
is also inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. As such, it would be 
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unwise to hold that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in regard to post-
judgment motions.2 
The State next argues that the district court had no duty to inquire into Ms. Bates' 
request for the appointment of substitute counsel because the basis for that request 
was vague. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State relies on Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 
610 (2013), for the proposition that a district court does not have a duty to inquire into a 
potential conflict of interest when the there is only a vague possibility that a conflict of 
interest exists. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State's reliance on Hall is entirely 
misplaced because Hall addresses a different duty of inquiry than the one addressed by 
Ms. Bates in her Appellant's Brief. Specifically, Hall addresses the requirement that a 
court inquire sua sponte into a potential conflict of interest when the court knows "or 
reasonably should know that a potential conflict of interest exists."3 State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980). 
2 If there is no right to counsel during post-judgment proceedings, then appointed 
counsel could actively argue against the client during those proceedings. In the event 
this occurs, the defendant would be left with no remedy other than filing a bar complaint 
or suing the attorney for malpractice, which is a course of action that one judge from the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has previously frowned upon. See Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 
31, 35 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., concurring) ("If he is denied effective assistance of 
counsel, and as a result he inadequately raises grounds for relief in his application to 
the court, he may file a subsequent application reasserting the grounds more fully. See 
I.C. § 19-4908. Thus, if a prisoner filed a timely application but it was dismissed due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel, I believe the prisoner would be entitled to file a 
subsequent application asserting his grounds for relief more fully even though the five-
year period of limitation under I.C. § 19-4902 had elapsed in the meantime. To hold 
otherwise would leave the prisoner with no alternative than to sue the attorney for 
malpractice-a distasteful and onerous undertaking-or to seek a writ of habeas corpus 
from a federal court, producing the very kind of outside interference in state judicial 
rrocesses that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act was intended to avoid."). 
A classic example of this type of conflict occurs when one attorney represents multiple 
criminal defendants. This type of representation will usually trigger a court's duty to 
affirmatively inquire into the potential conflict of interest because criminal codefendant's 
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An entirely different duty, which is found in a separate line of cases, is triggered 
when a defendant affirmatively requests the appointment of substitute counsel. 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703-704 n.9 (2009) (holding that when a defendant 
affirmatively requests substitute counsel "a separate and distinct obligation" to inquire is 
triggered and the standards espoused in Cuyler are not applicable). When a defendant 
requests substitute counsel a mandatory duty to inquire is triggered and must be 
undertaken "[e]ven when the trial court suspects that the defendant's requests are 
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the 
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient." State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887 
(Ct. App. 2012). As stated above, the affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict 
of interest addressed in Hall is triggered when the district court either actually knows or 
reasonably should known that an actual conflict of interest exists. Hall, at 617-618. 
However, when a defendant requests substitute counsel, the request alone triggers a 
duty of inquiry even when the judge thinks the defendant is lying about the need for 
appointment of substitute counsel. As such, the State's reliance on Hall is entirely 
misplaced because Ms. Bates affirmatively requested the appointment of substitute 
counsel.4 
In sum, Ms. Bates requested the appointment of substitute counsel. The district 
court erred when it denied that request without conducting the mandatory inquiry into 
generally have competing interests. This concern is addressed in a comment to Idaho 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1. 7, which states that "[t]he potential for conflict of interest 
in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer 
should decline to represent more than one codefendant." I.R.P.C. 1.7 cmt. 23. 
4 However, upon remand, if the district court learns that there is a potential conflict of 
interest between Ms. Bates and her trial counsel, then an affirmative duty of inquiry will 
be triggered. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347. 
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Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel. The State's argument that a district court has 
no duty to inquire into a post-judgment request for substitute counsel completely 
disregards the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that a statutory right to counsel is co-
extensive with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Additionally, the Murphy holding is 
not applicable to this case because Murphy addresses post-conviction proceedings 
pursuant to the UPCA and this matter deals with a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in 
the criminal proceedings. Moreover, from a policy perspective, the notion that an 
attorney need not be either competent or bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct 
during post-judgment proceedings undermines the credibility of both the Idaho State Bar 
and the legal professional as a whole. This in turn undermines the credibility of the 
Idaho Judiciary, as it controls the minimal ethical standards required of attorneys 
practicing in the State of Idaho. As such, Ms. Bates contends that it would be unwise to 




Ms. Bates respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with 
instructions for the district court to inquire into Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel. 
Ms. Bates also requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to allow 
Ms. Bates to withdraw her guilty plea. Alternatively, Ms. Bates requests that this Court 
reduce the fixed portion of her sentence from thirty years to either ten or fifteen years. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2014. 
__, 
~ L i ;---
.c"/ ·- V-------
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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